Penning- och valutapolitik nr 2 2006
Datum
2006-07-13
Riksbankens tidskrift Penning- och valutapolitik behandlar ämnen på riksbanksnära områden. I dag publiceras årets andra nummer som innehåller fyra artiklar:
Det offentliga ramverket för banker i EU – En introduktion
Eftersom bankerna har en inneboende instabilitet behöver de regleras, enligt Jonas Niemeyer på avdelningen för finansiell stabilitet. En offentlig reglering ligger också i allmänhetens intresse eftersom bankerna har en avgörande betydelse för det finansiella systemet. Den nuvarande strukturen på regelverket är nationell och de nationella myndigheterna ansvarar för att stabilitet upprätthålls i det finansiella systemet. Samtidigt blir bankkoncernerna i allt större omfattning internationella och denna gränsöverskridande verksamhet vänder sig i ökande utsträckning även till hushåll och små och medelstora företag, särskilt inom EU. Detta ställer regleringen på det finansiella området inför en rad utmaningar.
Supervisory arrangements, LoLR and crisis management in a single European banking market
In this paper, Arnoud W.A. Boot, University of Amsterdam and CEPR, discusses some key issues related to supervisory arrangements in the EMU countries, and particularly those relating to the LoLR structure and crisis management. The focus will be on the responsibilities and powers of individual countries and national central banks vis-à-vis the actors at the European level (the EU and the ECB). In this context various issues will be raised relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of the arrangements, and specifically the role and positioning of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in light of the fragmented supervisory structure.
Burden sharing in a banking crisis in Europe
Pan-European banks are starting to emerge, while arrangements for financial supervision and stability are still nationally rooted. According to Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics, and Dirk Schoenmaker, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the Dutch Ministry of Finance, this raises the issue who should bear the burden of any proposed recapitalisation in the event of failures in large cross-border banks. A recapitalisation is efficient if the social benefits (preserving systemic stability) exceed the cost of recapitalisation. Using the multi-country model of Frexas (2003), the authors show that ex post negotiations on burden sharing lead to an underprovision of recapitalisations. Against this background, they explore different ex ante burden sharing mechanisms.
Cross-border financial supervision in Europe: Goals and transition paths
In this paper, David G. Mayes, Bank of Finland, considers how the authorities in European countries might work together to ensure a framework for the efficient supervision of cross-border banks that are of systemic importance in at least one country, in a way that enables each country to claim credibility that it will be able to maintain financial stability. After reviewing the options, he argues that a collegial approach to supervision, where all the authorities are jointly responsible under a strengthened lead supervisor, might work well in normal times. However, maintaining financial stability calls for some form of hard-law international agreement among the partners on how problems will be avoided and handled, not simply a Memorandum of Understanding.
Tidskriften finns i pdf-format på Riksbankens webbplats under rubriken Publikationer/Penning- och valutapolitik. Den kan också hämtas i Riksbankens entré på Brunkebergstorg 11 eller beställas via e-post forradet@riksbank.se ,
