

## **Swedish Export Price Determination: Pricing to Market Shares?**

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October 5, 1999

### Abstract

The Swedish export price determination for automobiles and kraft paper to three destination countries, over the period 1980-1994, is investigated. Formal tests on an error correction model indicate results consistent with price discrimination in Swedish exports of both goods. The exporters use their market power for pricing to market, which is characterized by the concern for foreign conditions, and implies an incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The pricing behaviour seems to be determined by the development of market shares, in about half of the cases. The total pass-through to the local currency price within a year, that is the effect of an exchange rate change working through all variables and all interactions in the price determination, span between -85 % and +111 %.

**Keywords:** Cointegration, exchange rates, export prices, market shares, pass-through, pricing to market.

**JEL:** E30, F31, F41.

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An earlier version of this paper (with a slightly different data set and model) is circulated as Working Paper in Economics and Finance no. 306, Stockholm School of Economics.

I would especially like to thank Anders Vredin and Paul Söderlind for valuable suggestions and advice. I have also benefited from comments by Nils Gottfries, Richard Friberg, Tor Jacobson, Helen Jakobsson and Anders Warne. Financial support from Ragnar Söderberg's foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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## 1 Introduction

There has been a vast interest in questions about the relation between exchange rates and prices since the large fluctuations of the U.S. dollar in the mid-eighties. This field of research contributes to the understanding of the exchange rate's effect on inflation and the trade balance as well as the transmission of inflation across countries. It is also of relevance for comprehending the competitive process and the role of market structure in international trade. If exporters have some market power and markets are segmented, an exchange rate change may induce price discrimination across destination markets (pricing to market according to Krugman, 1987). This means that the exporters set different prices, in the exporters' currency, in different destinations. This in turn implies that the exchange rate pass-through, i.e. the response of the import price to an exchange rate change, is incomplete (local currency price stabilization). A destination specific markup adjustment thus absorbs part of the exchange rate change and there will be deviations from the law of one price.

Pricing to market could depend on nominal price rigidities and exchange rate surprises (e.g. as in Giovannini, 1988) or it could be due to deliberate price discrimination, which in turn could be related to destination market conditions such as market shares (see e.g. Feenstra et al., 1996). Deviations from the law of one price, due to exchange rate fluctuations, thus consist of two parts; deliberate price discrimination and exchange rate surprises. The former render price differentials across destinations *ex ante* based on exchange rate expectations. Through nominal price rigidities exchange rate surprises create price differentials *ex post* (see Giovannini, 1988). However, the framework used in this paper does not separate the two effects.

What are the explanations of pricing to market or more specifically, what conditions determine this price discrimination and the extent of it? Some prior studies have emphasized the importance of market structure characteristics. The extent of pricing to market and thus the source of markup variations has for example been explained by the size of the market share (Feenstra et al., 1996) and the concern for maintaining market shares. Because of slow adjustment of demand, the current price will affect the future customer stock and future revenues, suggesting that it might be worthwhile to have a stable short-run price and secure market shares (Gottfries, 1994 and Krugman, 1987). In that case, intertemporal links like the expected permanence of an exchange rate change might matter for the price setting (Froot and

Klemperer, 1989). Another, but similar, reason for the importance of forward looking exchange rate expectations is adjustment costs on the supply side (Kasa, 1992). The mechanism, for pricing to market, in the models above (and most prior studies) is thus primarily deliberate price discrimination due to various market forces, and not nominal price stickiness or the choice of invoicing currency. However, empirically pricing to market is often caused by a combination of market power and nominal rigidities, and most models do not attempt to separate these effects (an exception is Giovannini, 1988).

This paper examines the market share's importance for the Swedish export price determination for a few goods and destinations. Based on the assumption of costs of adjusting the traded quantity, a dynamic error correction model is formulated. This framework can simultaneously handle several endogenous variables and long run relations between them. Different characterizations of the price determination, e.g. whether the market share matters for the degree of pricing to market or not, are tested in terms of linear restrictions on the price setting relation. Furthermore, the framework and the set of data naturally lead to the question of exchange rate pass-through. Since pricing to market, by definition, is induced by exchange rate changes, this form of price discrimination is closely related to the exchange rate pass-through. The degree of price discrimination could consequently be measured as being reflected by different sizes of the exchange rate pass-through across destinations. Partial as well as total exchange rate pass-through coefficients are estimated. The partial pass-through measures the effect an exchange rate change has on the price setting relation, excluding the effects going through other variables and other long run relations. The total pass-through, in contrast, measures the entire effect an exchange rate change causes, working through every interaction of the price determination.

An extensive empirical literature on the relationship between exchange rate changes and price adjustments of traded goods has been built up, both on aggregate and industry level data (for surveys see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997 and Menon, 1995). Much of the empirical work has been done on large economies, particularly the US, Japan and Germany. The empirical evidence of pricing to market and incomplete exchange rate pass-through, for these countries, is substantial. Several studies show that producers price discriminate between markets and take destination specific market conditions into consideration when setting prices (see e.g. Giovannini, 1988, Gagnon and Knetter, 1995, Marston, 1990, Kasa, 1992 and Knetter, 1989, 1993).

For small open economies the conventional theoretical presumption is that exporters are price takers. This implies that they face an exogenously determined export price in foreign currency and that there is immediate and complete pass-through of both exchange rates and world market prices to their prices in their own currency. In contrast to this, several empirical studies indicate that the pricing to market hypothesis is relevant also for small open economies (see e.g. Alexius and Vredin, 1999, Athukorala and Menon, 1995 and Gottfries, 1994 for evidence on Sweden)<sup>1</sup>. Destination market conditions seem to be important for the export and import price determination. Even in small open economies, export producers thus seem to have some market power and ability to affect prices.

A simple comparison of the markup in different destination markets can indicate whether there is any long run pricing to market, since it is through markup adjustments that the exporter limits the impact of e.g. exchange rate fluctuations on competitiveness. The markups appear to exhibit different paths over time in different markets (see Figures 1-6)<sup>2</sup>, thus indicating price discrimination between destinations. As expected, for the homogenous good kraft paper, the development of the markups is more similar across markets compared to the markups across the automobile markets.

Moreover, consider Figure 7, which relates the relative price to the relative cost and suggests that the pass-through to the German import price of automobiles is limited. The exchange rate movements in 1981, 1982 and 1992 clearly increased the competitiveness by lowering the relative cost but part of the exchange rate change were absorbed in the export price implying that the local currency price were not completely affected. Even though the relation between the price of Swedish automobiles and the price of alternative products seems mean-reverting, the deviations from a stable relative price can be long lasting which indicates that the exporters in the German automobile market may not be price taking.

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<sup>1</sup> For evidence on other small open economies see e.g. Naug and Nymoene, 1996 (Norway), Lee, 1997 (Korea), and Menon, 1996 (Australia).

<sup>2</sup> The markups for automobiles are clearly trending over time, why a comparison of means is somewhat problematic since the mean is then time varying. One explanation for an upward trend could be some sort of product quality upgrading over time. This is then e.g. consistent with the Swedish exporters of automobiles gradually proceeding towards competing in the market segment for luxury cars, where markups usually are higher.

Since the markups are allowed to change over time, there may be a systematic covariation of markups with destination specific variables, e.g. market shares<sup>3</sup>, that could reflect a pricing to market behaviour. A large market share could imply that the exporter faces little competition and is able to pass through an exchange rate change to a greater extent (Feenstra et al., 1996). Figure 15 indicates that there is a positive significant correlation (see also Table 1) between the relative price ( $P_i / P_j$ ) and the relative market share for automobile exports to Germany and France. The export prices seem to differ between the two countries, thus indicating pricing to market, at least in the short-run<sup>4</sup>. The positive relation indicates that a larger market share in Germany is associated with a higher export price compared to France. Likewise, Figure 19 indicates a positive relation between the average relative prices and the average market shares for automobiles. The relation is however negative for kraft paper (see Figure 20). A careful analysis of the market share's effect on the pricing behaviour is thus needed.

The purpose of this paper is to study the transmission of an exchange rate change to Swedish export prices and the importance of the market share for the price determination. Section 2 contains a theoretical model of pricing to market and a description of the error correction model used for the empirical estimation. The data on Swedish exports is briefly discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4 and conclusions are provided in Section 5.

## 2 A model of pricing of market

Pricing to market requires market segmentation and barriers to arbitrage, in order for the exporter to be able to price discriminate across markets. However, markets could be segmented without the exporter being able to affect the export price. That prices differ between markets due to market segmentation is not inconsistent with the exporter being a price taker in some markets. In that case the price differential between the segmented markets may be completely determined by different prices of the competitors' products rather than reflect an ability for exporters to intentionally price discriminate. Furthermore, it can be of interest to distinguish some sort of monopoly power (represented by positive markups) from

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<sup>3</sup> That is, the Swedish export volume of a certain good divided by the total volume of imports of the same good in the destination market, ( $X_i / M_i$ ).

<sup>4</sup> All relative prices between destinations, ( $P_i / P_j$ ), are stationary using a univariate Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (without intercept). However, in a multivariate framework, Alexius and Vredin (1999) show that this relative price is non-stationary for most country pairs, why long run price discrimination could be present.

market segmentation where the latter is denoting an ability to charge different prices to different destinations, i.e. price discrimination. A monopoly producer charging positive markups does not necessarily have the power to price discriminate if e.g. arbitrage equalizes prices across destination markets.

The extent to which prices and markups are adjusted to exchange rate changes, depends on industry and destination specific factors like the degree of market segmentation (is the market integrated or separated with barriers to arbitrage?), product substitutability (is the product homogenous or differentiated?) and competition (is the market organization imperfectly competitive or are the producers price takers?). In the theoretical models changes in export prices are also highly dependent on the functional form, i.e. the convexity, of the demand curve (Dornbusch, 1987).

Pricing to market could occur due to dynamic aspects on both the demand and the supply side. Froot and Klemperer (1989) show that demand dynamics may explain producers' concern for reputation due to imperfectly informed consumers and various brand-switching costs. In that case the expected duration of an exchange rate movement will affect the pass-through, and the degree of pricing to market could be affected by the permanence of an exchange rate change. Supply side dynamics can arise from adjustment costs of changing the sales volume or fixed costs of entering and exiting a market (see e.g. Gagnon and Knetter, 1995 and Kasa, 1992). The response of the export price to an exchange rate change will then depend on both how recent the exchange rate change is and its duration. A transitory change may be completely absorbed by the profit margin without any import price response at all, while a permanent exchange rate change may induce a larger adjustment of supply allowing the exchange rate to pass-through to the import price.<sup>5</sup>

The model used here, is a hybrid of the models used by Gagnon and Knetter (1995) and Feenstra et al. (1996). Consider a profit maximizing firm selling a differentiated product to  $n$  separate destination markets, indexed by  $i$ . It is assumed that the markets are segmented such that no arbitrage can take place between the different destinations (the firm is able to price to market). This imperfectly competitive setting, in which it is assumed that price is the

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<sup>5</sup> This sensitivity of pricing to market could empirically be illustrated by the use of e.g. interest rate differentials representing the exchange rate expectations, along the lines of Froot and Klemperer (1989). This lies, however, outside the scope of this paper.

strategic variable, will yield a partial equilibrium where the price is set as a destination specific markup over costs. The profit maximizing problem of the firm is given by:

$$(1a) \quad \max_{P_i} \left( \sum_{i=1}^n P_i X_i - C\left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i, W\right) \right)$$

$$(1b) \quad s.t \quad X_i = f_i(P_i / E_i, P_i^{sub}, M_i)$$

where  $P_i$  is the price denoted in the exporter's currency,  $X_i$  is the quantity demanded as a function of the exporter's price in the buyer's currency,  $E_i$  is the exchange rate measured as exporter's currency per unit of buyer's currency (e.g. SEK/USD),  $P_i^{sub}$  the price of competing products denoted in the buyer's currency and  $M_i$  the totally demanded quantity on all varieties of the product.  $C$  is the total cost function and  $W$  is an index of input prices denoted in the exporter's currency. The exporter takes the price of competing products as fixed which implies that there is no direct neighbour in the product space, and any strategic interaction is thus absent. The first order condition yields:

$$(2) \quad P_i = MC \left( \frac{\eta_i}{\eta_i - 1} \right) \quad \forall i$$

where  $MC$  is marginal cost and  $\eta_i = - (\partial X_i / \partial P_i)(P_i / X_i)$  is the positive price elasticity of demand. The exporter's price, i.e. the markup, is thus determined by the elasticity of demand in the different destination markets, which in turn depends on features of the demand schedule. Since the price setting rule depends on the convexity of the demand, the price discrimination models that are consistent with pricing to market require a certain class of demand schedules, where the price elasticity of demand is not constant (Knetter, 1989). As seen from equation (2), price changes are due to either marginal cost changes or to changes in the markup. The commodity is assumed to be identical across destination markets which implies that the marginal cost is independent of the destination. This suggests that marginal cost changes will be common to all countries and it is consequently only destination specific markup changes that reflect a pricing to market behaviour.

A constant elasticity of demand, as with a log-linear demand curve, implies that the price to each market in the exporter's currency is a fixed markup over costs. This implies that an exchange rate change will be fully passed through to the price in the importer's currency. In

this case there is no residual variation in export prices that could be correlated with destination specific conditions like the exchange rate or the market share. Consequently, there is no price discrimination if the markup and the marginal costs are constant across destinations. If however the perceived demand schedule becomes more elastic as the local currency price increases, then the optimal markup charged by the exporter will fall as the buyer's currency depreciates and as a result the exchange rate pass-through will be incomplete (Knetter, 1989 and Marston, 1990). The demand schedules that fulfill this requirement for pricing to market, are the curves less convex than the constant elasticity curve, e.g. linear demand<sup>6</sup> (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). Assuming the markup to be variable and to respond to conditions in the destination market, i.e. assuming a non-constant elastic demand, thus implies that the exporter will adjust his markup in order to have a stable local currency price when for example the exchange rate changes.

To determine the price adjustment response to an exchange rate change, consider the case where the marginal cost is assumed to be constant, and differentiate equation (2) with respect to the exchange rate. This yields, after some manipulation, the following exchange rate elasticity of the export price (where  $t$  has been added, indicating the time period):

$$(3) \quad \frac{\partial P_{it}}{\partial E_{it}} \frac{E_{it}}{P_{it}} = \frac{\partial \eta_{it}}{\partial (P_{it}/E_{it})} \frac{(P_{it}/E_{it})}{\eta_{it}} \left[ \eta_{it} - 1 + \frac{\partial \eta_{it}}{\partial (P_{it}/E_{it})} \frac{(P_{it}/E_{it})}{\eta_{it}} \right]^{-1}$$

The pass-through<sup>7</sup> thus depends on how the demand elasticity is affected by a local currency price change. A constant elasticity of demand would imply that the export price is invariant to exchange rate changes,  $(\partial P_{it} / \partial E_{it})(E_{it} / P_{it}) = 0$ , and hence that the pass-through to the price in the importer's currency is complete. From the second order condition for profit maximization

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<sup>6</sup> The elasticity with respect to the local currency price increases for these curves.

<sup>7</sup> The concept pass-through is commonly used interchangeable for the effects of an exchange rate change on both export and import prices. In this paper pass-through is solely defined as the import price response to an exchange rate change (measured in local currency,  $1/E$ ), i.e. pass-through =  $- [(\partial P / \partial E)(E / P) - 1]$ .



follows that the expression within brackets is positive<sup>8</sup> and if the demand elasticity increases with the local currency price, the entire equation is positive which implies that the export price will be adjusted to offset an exchange rate change. An appreciation of the exporter's currency will then lower the price, in the exporter's currency, so the exporter adjusts the profit margin, i.e. the markup, in order to have a stable local currency price and limit the deteriorated competitiveness.

Allowing the marginal costs to vary with the exchange rate implies that a term representing the exchange rate elasticity of marginal costs should be added in equation (3)<sup>9</sup>. If the marginal cost is increasing in the exchange rate, a depreciation of the exporter's currency will increase the export price more than if the marginal cost is constant, and thus further limit the pass-through effect on the local currency price. Hence, the pass-through is negatively related to the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the exchange rate.

In most analyses of pricing to market the marginal cost is assumed to be constant with respect to the volume of sales. If the marginal cost instead were varying with supply, the optimal price in a certain market would be dependent on the quantity sold to all other destination markets. Consequently, demand conditions in every market should be incorporated into the price determination. This could also imply that the "direct" or partial pass-through effect is offset via the change in marginal costs due to an exchange rate movement. An appreciation of the exporter's currency, *ceteris paribus*, would increase the local currency price and thus reduce demand for the exporter's commodity. If the marginal cost were increasing in output, the reduction in output would diminish the marginal costs and consequently also reduce the export price. The pass-through of the exchange rate would thus be even more limited. The

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<sup>8</sup> To see this explicitly, define equation (2) as;  $H(P) = P(1 - 1/\eta) - MC = 0$ , which implies that the first order condition is equivalent to;  $H(P) \frac{\partial X}{\partial P} = 0$ . The second order condition for profit maximization yields;

$$\frac{\partial H(P)}{\partial P} \frac{\partial X}{\partial P} + H(P) \frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial P^2} < 0, \text{ knowing that } H(P) \text{ is zero and assuming that the commodity is normal, i.e. } (\partial X /$$

$$\partial P) < 0, \text{ this implies that } (\partial H(P) / \partial P) \text{ must be positive for this to hold so; } \frac{\partial H(P)}{\partial P} = \frac{1}{\eta} \left[ \eta - 1 + \frac{\partial \eta}{\partial P/E} \frac{P/E}{\eta} \right] > 0,$$

and from  $(\partial X / \partial P) < 0$  follows that  $\eta > 0$ , and consequently the bracket is positive.

<sup>9</sup> In that case the exchange rate elasticity of the export price is:

$$\frac{\partial P_{it}}{\partial E_{it}} \frac{E_{it}}{P_{it}} = \left[ \frac{\partial \eta_{it}}{\partial (P_{it} / E_{it})} \frac{(P_{it} / E_{it})}{\eta_{it}} + (\eta_{it} - 1) \left( \frac{\partial MC_{it}}{\partial E_{it}} \frac{E_{it}}{MC_{it}} \right) \right] \left[ \eta_{it} - 1 + \frac{\partial \eta_{it}}{\partial (P_{it} / E_{it})} \frac{(P_{it} / E_{it})}{\eta_{it}} \right]^{-1}$$

pass-through is therefore negatively related to the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output (Yang, 1997).

Taking logarithms of equation (2) and using a first order Taylor approximation of  $\ln(\eta_i/\eta_i - 1)$  around a suitable value, say the average, yields the following relation:

$$(4) \quad \ln P_{ii} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln MC_{ii} + \beta_2 \ln SH_{ii} + \beta_3 \ln E_{ii} + \beta_4 \ln P_{ii}^{sub}$$

where  $\beta_0$  is an intercept sweeping up all the constant terms in the Taylor expansion,  $MC$  is the marginal costs and  $SH$  is the market share defined as the Swedish export volume of a good divided by the total volume of imports of the good to one destination ( $X_i / M_i$ ). Assuming the elasticity of demand with respect to total imports of the good to be one, allows the simplifying restriction of a one-to-one relation between the export volume and total imports of a good (i.e. the market share) to matter for the price determination<sup>10</sup>.

All coefficients are expected to be positive. The sign of the market share coefficient,  $\beta_2$ , is expected to be positive since a higher market share implies a lower price elasticity<sup>11</sup> and thus the ability to charge a higher price. As mentioned above, the sign and size of the exchange rate coefficient,  $\beta_3$ , depends on the ability to price discriminate (which in turn is dependent on the elasticity of the demand curve). If pricing to market is present  $\beta_3$  is expected to be positive and less than one (implying a limited pass-through). Furthermore, in the long run the exchange rate and the price of alternative products are expected to have a symmetrical effect on the price setting ( $\beta_3 = \beta_4$ ). Theoretically, it is also expected that the coefficients on the marginal cost and the exchange rate will sum to one ( $\beta_3 = 1 - \beta_1$ ). This implies that a marginal cost change and an exchange rate change have identical effects on the price measured in the local currency (to see this, subtract the logarithm of the exchange rate from both sides of equation (4) to convert it to the destination currency). If this nominal neutrality is imposed, the long run price setting relation can be reformulated as;  $(\ln P_i - \ln E_i - \ln P_i^{sub}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\ln PPI^l - \ln E_i - \ln P_i^{sub}) + \beta_2 \ln SH_i$ , where the relative price is expressed as a function of competitiveness, measured as the relative cost and the market share.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> This implies that some information on the relation between  $X_i$  and  $M_i$  might be disregarded but due to few observations it is preferable to restrict the number of variables to a minimum to gain degrees of freedom.

<sup>11</sup> Given a demand curve consistent with pricing to market, i.e. a less convex curve than the constant elastic one.

<sup>12</sup> See Section 4.2 for the other restrictions that are tested on the long run price setting relation.

Recognizing that the marginal costs are likely to change due to movements in the exchange rate (e.g. because of implied changes in the prices of imported inputs,  $W$ ), one would presumably like to control for such an indirect mechanism when estimating the pass-through coefficient of equation (4). A disaggregated producer price index,  $PPI^l$  (where  $l$  denotes product), will therefore be used as an empirical proxy for marginal costs. The exchange rate coefficient,  $\beta_3$ , will then capture the direct effect of an exchange rate change on the export price, excluding the effect of indirect changes in the marginal costs from this estimate. The marginal cost coefficient,  $\beta_l$ , will incorporate the direct and indirect destination specific effect of common marginal cost changes on the price setting rule. Furthermore, the producer price index may capture not only marginal costs but also for example markups common to all destinations. In that case, one could interpret the destination specific ratio ( $P_i / PPI^l$ ) as reflecting the extent to which the exporter imposes a markup on market  $i$  above the average, or product specific, markup.

Equation (4) is static and disregards any gradual adaptations of the export price to changes in the explanatory variables, why it may be interpreted as a long run price setting relation. However, in the short-run there will be deviations from equation (4), since a disturbance (e.g. an exchange rate shock) will yield dynamic adjustment processes of both consumers and producers, for example due to nominal price rigidities and adjustment costs in demand and supply. Assuming adjustment costs on the supply side, implies that the price determination can be modelled in an error correction framework<sup>13</sup> where the price change depends on prior deviations from the long run cointegrating relations as well as the short-run dynamics, i.e. prior changes in the explanatory variables. This setting follows along the lines of Gagnon and Knetter (1995) which derive an error correction model for export prices using quadratic costs of adjusting the volume of trade.<sup>14</sup> The conventional analysis of a relation like (4) is often done within a single equation framework, possibly on error correction form<sup>15</sup>. The latter seems suitable given the commonly accepted non-stationarity of nominal variables such as price levels. The empirical analysis will be done in Johansen's (1988, 1991) multivariate framework which allows several cointegrating relations as well as a simultaneous estimation

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<sup>13</sup> Quadratic loss functions like adjustment costs typically yield error correction equations (Nickell, 1985).

<sup>14</sup> Another example of an adjustment cost model of pricing to market is Kasa (1992) which derives an error correction model also with the use of quadratic costs of adjusting supply.

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Feenstra et al. (1996), Naug and Nymoer (1996), Gagnon and Knetter (1995) and Athukorala and Menon (1995).

of the long run relations and short-run dynamics. Furthermore, the multivariate setting, in contrast to the single equation approach, makes it possible to explicitly treat problems of identifying the price setting relation. If one expects that there are more than one cointegrating relation among the variables the multivariate approach are to be preferred, because if information about the long run relations can be found in all equations of the system, it also makes the estimators more efficient.

The Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen, 1988) consists in estimating an error correction representation of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of order  $k$ . The form is as follows:

$$(5) \quad \Delta z_t = \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \Gamma_j \Delta z_{t-j} + \Pi z_{t-1} + \mu + \Phi D_t + \varepsilon_t \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$

where  $z_t$  is an  $n$ -dimensional column vector,  $\mu$  is a vector of constants,  $D_t$  is a vector of deterministic variables, such as seasonal dummies and intervention dummies, and  $\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_T$  independent identically distributed  $N_n(0, \Sigma)$  disturbances. In this setting the variable vector consists of five variables,  $z = [p, ppi^l, sh, e, p_i^{sub}]'$  (where lower case letters denote logarithmic values).  $\Gamma_j$  represents the short-run dynamics while the lagged level term,  $\Pi z_{t-1}$ , is the error correction term of stationary linear combinations of the  $z$  variables. If the rank of  $\Pi$  is less than  $n$  ( $r < n$ ),  $\Pi$  can be decomposed into  $\Pi = \alpha \beta'$  with  $\alpha$  as an  $(n \times r)$  matrix of adjustment coefficients toward the long run equilibrium and  $\beta$  an  $(n \times r)$  matrix of cointegration vectors implying that the long run relation  $\beta' z_t$  is stationary, even if  $z_t$  is non-stationary. When the cointegration rank is larger than one there is an identification problem, since it is only the space spanned by the cointegration vectors,  $\beta$ , that is uniquely determined and not the parameters of the individual vectors. The  $\Pi$ -matrix could equally well be decomposed into  $\Pi = \alpha \xi^{-1} \xi \beta'$  with  $\xi$  as an arbitrary but non-singular  $(r \times r)$  matrix of restrictions that will just work as “normalizations”. Consequently there is only  $((n-r) \times r)$  free or estimable parameters, and to exactly identify these one has to impose  $r^2$  independent restrictions on  $\beta$ . It is always possible to take a linear combination of the unrestricted cointegration vectors, impose  $r$  identifying restrictions to each vector without changing the likelihood function (Johansen and Juselius, 1990, 1994). A testable economic hypothesis on a specific vector thus requires an overidentified system, i.e. more than these  $r^2$  restrictions must be imposed. In order to get an,

in some sense, economic identification, i.e. the ability to distinguish the different vectors from each other and thereby interpret them in economic terms, one often has to impose overidentifying restrictions on  $\beta$ .

Some attention should be given to the constants,  $\mu$ , through which the model allows for drift components in the data. The statistical inference, i.e. the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics, is affected by the assumptions maintained on the constant (whether the drift components are pure stochastic trends or stochastic trends with a drift). The constant can be decomposed into two parts, one contributing to the intercept in the cointegrating relation and the other determining a linear trend. If the underlying process(es) does not contain a linear trend the constant should be restricted to the cointegration space as an intercept. If there instead are deterministic trends in the variables (which appears to be the case here since most series seem to trend upwards over time), these will enter via the constant term in the model but not be present in the cointegrating relations since these common trends are supposed to cancel (Johansen, 1991). However, due to composition effects in unit values and productivity growth there might in fact be long run deterministic trends also in the cointegrating relations. In addition, composition effects and productivity growth could explain the presence of a trend in the markups and relative costs (see Figures 1-12) which suggests that a time trend probably should be added to the producer price index in order to get a more accurate marginal cost proxy. To account for these problems, a linear trend is therefore added in the long run cointegrating relations<sup>16</sup>. The estimated model will thus have the following form<sup>17</sup>:

$$(6) \quad \Delta z_t = \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} \Gamma_j \Delta z_{t-j} + \alpha(\beta', \beta_6)(z_{t-1}, t) + \mu + \Phi D_t + \varepsilon_t \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$

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<sup>16</sup> The model will then allow for  $r$  trend stationary relations (an  $I(0)$  process plus a linear trend) and  $n-r$  variables that are composed of an  $I(1)$  process plus a linear trend. The stochastic part of  $\beta'z_t$  is still stationary but the model permits for a linear trend in all components of the process, a trend which cannot be eliminated by the cointegrating relations (Johansen, 1994).

<sup>17</sup> The constant in equation (4),  $\beta_0$ , will be excluded in the empirical estimation of the long run relations and instead incorporated into the error correction model via  $\mu$ . Testing hypotheses on this "simplified" form of the long run relation will not be dependent on the constant since it is not affecting the stationarity of a possible cointegration vector, which will then instead be stationary around a non-zero mean.

### 3 Data

A disaggregated approach seems appropriate since the theoretical reasons for pricing to market emphasize market characteristics, and the extent of price discrimination is thus expected to differ across industries and commodities. Disaggregated price data for a certain commodity to different destinations are not available so the traditional approach of using unit values, i.e. export value in current prices divided by export volume in units, taken from the official trade statistics, is applied in this study. This introduces measurement errors in the dependent variable since fluctuations in unit values can occur for other reasons than price changes. Fluctuations that are not related to genuine price movements can for example occur due to differences in quality over time, variances in commodity composition or a shift towards less heavy products. These problems can be more or less severe and vary over products, countries and time. Using quantitatively important destinations help mitigate the problems (Börjesson, 1989).

Two commodities on the 4-digit SITC level and three destination markets have been selected for the empirical analysis. The two commodities were chosen on basis of being the largest goods, in terms of value, in Sweden's exports, namely passenger transport vehicles and kraft paper<sup>18</sup>. Ex ante it is also presumed that these quite different goods will illustrate different pricing behaviour. Automobiles are a highly differentiated product while kraft paper seems to be a more homogenous good. Furthermore, the market for automobiles seems to be segmented due to several reasons, e.g. service, warranties and environmental regulations that are specific to a certain destination (see e.g. Goldberg and Knetter, 1997 and Flam and Nordström, 1995), while one would expect kraft paper to be sold in a more integrated world market<sup>19</sup>. Nevertheless, highly customized contracts could create possibilities for price discrimination also in the kraft paper markets. In addition, the sizes of the average Swedish market shares differ substantially between automobiles and kraft paper<sup>20</sup>, which could generate divergent pricing reactions to an exchange rate change. The destination countries are Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The data consist of quarterly averages, from the period 1980:1-

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<sup>18</sup> These sectors delivered 5.99% and 2.27% of total Swedish exports in 1993 respectively. Source: Statistics Sweden. Kraft paper is e.g. used in the manufacture of sacks and other emballage.

<sup>19</sup> Alexius and Vredin (1999) though show that the relative price of kraft paper between markets is non-stationary which indicates market segmentation.

<sup>20</sup> The average market share across destinations over the sample period is 1.2 % and 42 % respectively.

1994:4<sup>21</sup>, constructed from monthly data. A more detailed definition of the data material is provided in appendix A.1.

The price of substitutes ( $P^{sub}$ ) is approximated by the unit value of total imports of each good to each destination market. This implies the somewhat disturbing simplifying assumption that the good only competes with other imported products, e.g. a Volvo car competes with BMW in France but not in Germany. A more appropriate measure of the price of substitutes would include domestic products as well as import competing goods but such data are more difficult to obtain. Concerning kraft paper this assumption seems to be less of a problem since there are practically no domestic producers in Germany, France or the United Kingdom.

A disaggregated producer price index is used as a proxy for production costs in the exporting country. For automobiles a domestic producer price index for transport equipment ( $PPI^t$ ) is used while the kraft paper production costs are proxied by a producer price index for pulp ( $PPF^{ulp}$ ). The producer price indices can vary due to other things than cost fluctuations, e.g. due to changes in markups why there can be some noise or measurement error in this variable. Assuming the producer prices to reflect the development of the marginal costs, e.g. captured by the marginal cost times a constant, this error will though not affect the stationarity of any hypothesized long run relation per se. Moreover, to account for productivity growth and possible composition effects in unit values, as mentioned above, a linear trend is added in the estimated model (see equation (6)). Using producer prices instead of unit labor costs is preferable since the producer prices also reflect other input costs. However, this could introduce the problem of simultaneity since the producer price index is determined not only by factor prices but also by the development of the export prices. Hence, if the long-run relations were to be estimated separately, the error term and an explanatory variable (the producer prices) are likely to be correlated which thus leads to inconsistent estimates using ordinary least squares. The procedure used here (Johansen, 1988) is based on the entire system of equations and produces full-information maximum likelihood estimates which are at least asymptotically efficient. As usual, the finite sample properties remain ambiguous. On the other hand, an alternative specification with unit labor costs as a proxy for production costs has also been tested, indicating similar results as when using producer prices as a cost approximation.

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<sup>21</sup> For France the sample period is 1984:1-1994:4.

The producer prices are affected by the exchange rate through imported inputs and given the importance of the selected sectors, it is not unreasonable to assume that these sectors exert some influence on labor demand. Thus, the export price gives feedback to the production costs and the latter are hence assumed to be endogenously determined (Kongsted, 1996). In contrast, it appears reasonable to assume that the exchange rate is free from feedback from other variables in the system, since a deteriorated competitiveness for a single commodity does not induce a monetary policy reaction, like a depreciation. Nevertheless, the devaluations of the Swedish krona in the eighties were clearly an effect of domestic policy measures that did not neglect the market conditions of export firms (i.e. their competitiveness). All variables are assumed to be endogenous in a statistical sense, where exogeneity is determined with respect to parameters in the likelihood function and not by economic reasoning. Consequently, this full system allows for any feedback effects between the variables (see e.g. Hung et al., 1993 and Kongsted, 1996 for a discussion of such matters).

## 4 Empirical estimation

### 4.1 Model specification

Non-normality of the residuals is a problem why a set of deterministic variables is included to overcome the most severe problems, which appear in the equations for the exchange rate and the price of substitutes (not shown). To account for the large devaluations of the Swedish krona in September 1981 and October 1982 and the shift to a floating exchange rate regime in November 1992 the following dummies are included in all regressions:

$$D_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } t \in I_i \quad i = 1,2,3 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where  $I_1 = \{1981:4\}$ <sup>22</sup>,  $I_2 = \{1982:4\}$ ,  $I_3 = \{1992:4\dots1994:4\}$ . Using these deterministic variables to capture identified exchange rate fluctuations will also enable one to determine the effect, or pass-through, of purely exogenous exchange rate movements (see Section 4.3). To

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<sup>22</sup> Since the exchange rate series consist of quarterly averages of the spot rates, the timing (within a quarter) of a fluctuation matters for what quarter a change primarily is reflected in. The devaluation in September 1981 appears, in the data, mainly in the last quarter of 1981.



take care of the seasonal pattern in the data, three centered seasonal dummies<sup>23</sup> are also included in the regressions. Furthermore, for the export of automobiles to Germany and the United Kingdom, two different sets of deterministic variables are included to explain the outliers in the two price series.<sup>24</sup>

To determine the adequate lag structure, conditioning the model on this set of deterministic variables, the model specification tests are applied to both the unrestricted VAR model ( $r = 5$ ), (see Table 2a), and the more restricted vector error correction model (VEC) where the choice of cointegration rank is varied ( $r \in \{1, \dots, 4\}$ ). The VAR model is tested in order to make sure that the choice of the cointegration rank is made on a correctly specified model. However, since the inference and interpretations are made on the VEC model, the residuals also need to be checked when the cointegration rank has been decided (see Tables 2b and 2c).

The number of lags,  $k$ , has been determined by checking that there is no further multivariate autocorrelation of first-order in the regressions, according to the LM test, nor any multivariate non-normality at the chosen lag specification. Two lags<sup>25</sup> are chosen for all markets except for the export of automobiles to Germany (three lags). This lag structure appears to give appropriate properties of the residuals in both the VAR and the VEC model. However, the univariate tests on the residuals from the VEC model, with cointegration rank two, indicate some non-normality (see Table 2c) but given that the critical values are based on the asymptotic distribution and that the empirical values are substantially larger, these problems are left without further consideration.

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<sup>23</sup> These centered dummies sum to zero for every year and have the advantage that they do not change the limit distribution of the rank tests and furthermore that the constant,  $\mu$ , captures the true mean (including the parts that would be seized by uncentered seasonal dummies) in the error correction model.

<sup>24</sup> For the German automobile market  $D_{4,t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } t = 1985:4 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  and  $D_{5,t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } t = 1988:1 \\ -1 & \text{for } t + 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  are included

while for the British market  $D_{6,t} = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } t = 1988:3 \\ 1 & \text{for } t + 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$  is incorporated (see also Figures 21-23 respectively).

These dummies do not have a clear economic interpretation, nevertheless the spikes in data are apparent outliers why those observations, in this way, are excluded.

<sup>25</sup> That is two lags in the vector autoregressive model (in levels) or consequently one lag in the error correction model.

The number of cointegrating relations can be found from the relation,  $r = n - s$  where  $r$  is the number of cointegration vectors,  $n$  the number of variables and  $s$  the number of common stochastic trends (Stock and Watson, 1988). The result from the likelihood ratio test<sup>26</sup> indicate all from zero cointegration vectors (automobile export to Germany) to three cointegration vectors (automobile export to France and kraft paper export to the United Kingdom and France); see Table 3. However, the number of common stochastic trends is expected to be equal across destinations and since the likelihood ratio test is based on asymptotic critical values, these tests should be interpreted cautiously. Moreover, the size and spread of the eigenvalues seem to suggest that the system contains two cointegrating relations for most markets and hence, with five non-stationary variables<sup>27</sup>, three common stochastic trends. These three trends could be interpreted as; importer's (buyer's) inflation, exporter's (seller's) inflation, i.e. foreign and domestic monetary policies, and a third trend which is harder to interpret but perhaps is reflecting some sort of commodity specific trend. In addition, if the monetary policies are common there is possibly three cointegration vectors, but given the accommodating Swedish policy and thereby the large depreciations of the krona in 1981, 1982 and 1992 it seems reasonable to assume that there are two distinct nominal trends. The two cointegration vectors are assumed to capture the long run relations between the variables in the system. It seems reasonable to interpret one as reflecting a price setting policy or supply relation like (4) and the other to capture a demand relation like (1b). If the third trend is absent, this could explain a finding of three cointegration vectors. In that case there is a third cointegrating relation that for example could be interpreted as capturing the price determination of the substitutes.

Previous studies mostly use a single equation approach (e.g. Feenstra et al., 1996 and Gagnon and Knetter, 1995) and thus abstract from problems arising from the finding of several cointegration vectors. Given the large number of variables and a model that is not capturing all micro-foundations, additional long run relations except those two previously mentioned, are perhaps floating around in the system, e.g. a relation determining marginal cost, such as a labor demand or supply relation. This leads to problems of how to identify and interpret the cointegration vectors. When testing hypotheses on one of these vectors one must have in mind that without identifying the different vectors, the test could be carried out on a different vector than intended, e.g. on a demand relation instead of the price-setting (supply) relation. This

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<sup>26</sup> 5% significance is used throughout the paper.

<sup>27</sup> All series are non-stationary according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (available upon request).

implies that overidentifying restrictions must be placed on each vector in order to enable meaningful tests of hypotheses on specific relations.

Since the mechanism driving a markup variation is based on the demand elasticity, the problem of whether the estimated price and demand vectors are consistent also arises. An indication of pricing to market in a supposed price setting vector will strictly imply that a second cointegration vector can not be interpreted as a demand vector, since a log-linear demand relation results in a constant elastic demand. In this case the optimal markup will be fixed and the price setting not affected by destination specific effects like the exchange rate or the market share. An alternative less strict but also more reasonable interpretation, is that the estimated demand vector is only a linearized expression of the actual and perhaps non-constant elastic demand function. If the pass-through instead is complete and the market share does not play a role in the price determination, then it is possible to interpret the cointegration vectors as a price setting vector and a constant elastic demand vector respectively without inconsistencies with theory.

#### 4.2 Pricing to market

To establish the exporter's long run pricing behaviour and the conditions affecting the price determination, some theoretically plausible cointegration vectors are examined. In a first step, a test for the number of cointegration vectors guides the decision on the cointegration rank. According to this test (as discussed above) the cointegration rank appears to be two for all destinations. Second, it is tested whether certain theoretically motivated restrictions are contained in the cointegration space, in particular whether any vector in the space is consistent with a hypothesized price setting relation. Third, one may try to distinguish a specific cointegration vector as a price setting relation by making identifying assumptions such that all vectors have an economic interpretation.

The first question to be examined is whether the exporter has some market power, and thus prices above marginal costs, or is merely a price taker in a perfectly competitive market. An empirical finding of a positive markup could arise in two different settings, in perfectly competitive markets where the producer price is a bad approximation for the marginal costs or in imperfectly competitive markets where the exporter has some market power. The producer price indices are not pure cost data but nevertheless a reasonable proxy for the development of

the marginal costs<sup>28</sup>, why a systematically varying, non-zero, markup is interpreted as an indication of market power. A stationary non-zero markup implies market power as well, but can not bring about exchange rate induced price discrimination on average since a stable long run relation between export prices and such destination specific conditions is then infeasible (given that exchange rates are non-stationary). Constant elasticities of demand that differ across destinations can cause stationary price differences, i.e. differences in the stable markups due to market segmentation. Systematic variations in markups, in contrast, can show up as autoregression, e.g. non-stationarity, or a covariation with other variables. If the markup covaries with destination specific variables, like the market share, the exchange rate or the price of substitutes, this suggests that foreign market conditions are relevant for the price determination and that the exporter prices to market. These non-stationary price differences require non-constant elastic demand schedules.

To account for productivity growth and possible composition effects in data a linear trend is added in order to get a better marginal cost proxy, and hence it is tested whether the markup is stationary plus a linear trend. The first hypothesis ( $H_1$ ), (see Table 4), is that the markup is trend stationary, i.e. (an  $I(0)$  process plus a linear trend). If this hypothesis can be rejected, the markup is non-stationary (plus a linear trend) and could thus be cointegrated with other non-stationary variables, which would suggest an intentional, long run, price discrimination. If the relative price ( $p_i - e_i - p_i^{sub}$ ) is stationary,  $H_2$ , the exporter is said to be a “price taker”. The effect of changes in the exchange rate and the price of foreign substitutes on the export price will be complete. However, a stable relative price need not necessarily be interpreted as a “forced” price taking but can be explained by a deliberate collusion where the producers agree on a common local currency price. Such mechanisms do, however, lie beyond the scope of this paper and can not be explained by the model used here. If  $H_2$  is rejected and furthermore the markup is cointegrated with other destination specific variables, there is a clear indication of pricing to market. To examine the sources of the markup variation three different hypotheses are tested.  $H_3$  states that the relative price, the relative cost and the market share create a stationary relation. It imposes symmetry on the exchange rate and the price of alternative products in addition to nominal neutrality, which implies that the relative price can be expressed as a function of competitiveness, measured as the relative cost and the market share.  $H_4$  suggests that the market share can be excluded from such a relation and thus

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<sup>28</sup> Assuming the producer price to capture the marginal cost times a constant, implies that the stationarity of a long run relation will not be affected by this marginal cost approximation.

characterizes a pricing to market behaviour that is not directed by the concern for market shares. Hence, it is only the relative cost that matters for the relative price.  $H_5$  states that the markup is cointegrated exclusively with the market share.

In the short-run there might be deviations from any of the above hypothesized long run relations. The short-run influence of the market share, on the price setting behaviour, can then differ from the long run effects of the market share. The short-run dynamics of the price equation is therefore examined as well, and it is tested whether lagged changes of the market share matter for the short-run alterations of the export price. Since the primary interest is to examine the effects of the market share and the exchange rate on the export price determination, the short-run dynamics of the other variables in the price setting system are not scrutinized. Besides, the model used in this paper does not give any strict theoretical conjectures on the short-run dynamics of these other variables.

#### 4.3 Exchange rate pass-through

Moreover, the question arises how pass-through is defined in this setting. The total effect of a change in the exchange rate, working through all interactions of the system, i.e. including the effect on all variables and through both cointegration vectors, is one possible interpretation instead of the partial effect through the price setting behaviour. However, to estimate this effect one needs to identify exogenous exchange rate movements. Given that the exchange rate is allowed to affect all variables in the system, the total effect can not be read off directly from the cointegrating relations because of the cross-effects between the variables. Here, the exchange rate pass-through will be estimated both as the partial elasticity in the long run price setting relation (i.e. the partial elasticity of the export price with respect to the exchange rate in one of the cointegration vectors) and as a total effect in the error correction model. The latter is calculated as the total response in the short-run pricing equation following the two devaluations of the Swedish krona in 1981 and 1982, and the depreciation of the krona in 1992.

To uniquely determine the long run partial pass-through elasticity one needs to impose  $r$  exactly identifying restrictions on the cointegration vector in question (i.e. on a presumed

price setting relation). Different choices of these  $r$  identifying restrictions<sup>29</sup> will imply different pass-through coefficients. By varying the identifying restrictions one can, though, determine an interval for the exchange rate elasticity. However, the theoretically plausible cointegrating relations may require overidentifying restrictions why another alternative is to focus on the long run partial pass-through elasticity in the hypothesized price relations which are contained in the cointegrating space (i.e. if any of  $H_2$ ,  $H_3$  or  $H_4$  are not rejected). The second approach were chosen since the three different normalizations<sup>30</sup>, imposed on a presumed price setting relation, gave rise to intervals with abnormally large coefficients (not shown), probably as a consequence of the problems of identifying a true price setting relation.

A total short-run pass-through<sup>31</sup> in the error correction model (equation (6)), due to a pure exogenous shock to the system (i.e. a change in the dummy variables ( $D_{1,t}$  and  $D_{2,t}$ ) representing the devaluations in 1981 and 1982 respectively), is calculated by comparing the pricing equation's response with the response in the exchange rate equation.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the total pass-through is determined for the depreciation in 1992 (which is identified by a change in  $\Delta D_{3,t}$ ), following the shift from a fixed to a floating currency regime. However, this dummy variable ( $D_{3,t}$ ) represents the regime shift and not the explicit exchange rate shock per se, why the resulting pass-through might capture the effects of a combination of the depreciation and the switch to a floating currency.

The total exchange rate pass-through estimate includes all the consequences an exogenous exchange rate change causes to the pricing equation, i.e. the effect working through the entire short-run dynamics (all partial coefficients in  $\Gamma$ ) as well as the effect working through both cointegration vectors. To see this explicitly, formulate the system in the following way (assuming a VAR model of order two):

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<sup>29</sup> In this case  $r = 2$ .

<sup>30</sup> The exchange rate elasticity were estimated for a relation determining the markup, for a relation excluding the market share and finally for a relation where an exchange rate change has the same effect as a change in the price of foreign substitutes. The identifying restrictions imposed were  $[1, -1, \beta_{13}, \beta_{14}, \beta_{15}, \beta_{16}]'$ ,  $[1, \beta_{12}, 0, \beta_{14}, \beta_{15}, \beta_{16}]'$  and  $[1, \beta_{12}, \beta_{13}, \beta_{14}, \beta_{14}, \beta_{16}]'$  respectively.

<sup>31</sup> The partial short-run pass-through is found in the dynamics of the pricing equation ( $\Gamma_{j,14}$ ) in the error correction model (see equation (6)).

<sup>32</sup> Apart from the exchange rate changes the dummy variables might also capture some other distortion in the system why the results should be interpreted with caution. With further identifying assumptions one could estimate different pass-through effects from different structural shocks, which though lie beyond the scope of this paper.

$$(6) \quad \begin{bmatrix} \Delta z_t \\ \beta' z_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mu \\ \beta' \mu \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \phi \\ \beta' \phi \end{bmatrix} D_t + \begin{bmatrix} \Gamma & \alpha \\ \beta' \Gamma & (I + \beta' \alpha) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta z_{t-1} \\ \beta' z_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \alpha \beta_6 \\ \beta' \alpha \beta_6 \end{bmatrix} t + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t \\ \beta' \varepsilon_t \end{bmatrix}$$

$$y_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 D_t + B y_{t-1} + \theta_2 t + \eta_t$$

Hence, the B-matrix will capture the complete effect on all variables and both the channels the exchange rate change is working through (i.e. the short-run run dynamics and both cointegration vectors). The resulting response in vector  $y_t$  due to a shift in the dummy variable is thus; (response ( $y_{t+s}$ )) =  $B^s \theta_1$ .<sup>33</sup> Since  $\Delta z_t = G y_t$  where  $G = [I_5 \ 0_{5 \times 2}]$ , the response in the levels of the z-variables is (in period  $t+s$  following a depreciation in period  $t$ ); (response ( $z_{t+s}$ )) =  $\sum_{j=0}^s GB^j \theta_1$ . The total effect on the export price in period  $t+s$  of an exchange rate change in period  $t$  could thus be calculated as; (response ( $p_{t+s}$ )) / (response ( $e_t$ )).

## 4.4 Empirical results

### 4.4.1 Long run hypothesis testing

For *exports of automobiles to Germany*,  $H_1$  can not be rejected at 5 % significance (see Table 5) which suggests that the exporters lack market power that could be used for long run price discrimination. Figure 7 also indicates that the relative price is mean reverting. However,  $H_2$  can be rejected which suggests that the deviations from a stable relative price are long lasting.<sup>34</sup> The exchange rate and the price of substitutes affect the price determination symmetrically and nominal neutrality seems to be at hand, since  $H_3$  and  $H_4$  can not be rejected.  $H_4$  though gives more plausible coefficients compared to  $H_3$  (see Table 9), which appear to indicate that the price discrimination is not related to the development of the market share. Nevertheless, this result might be due to the restriction of the one-to-one relation between the exported and imported quantity of the product (captured by the market share), and that a more flexible relation between these two variables would be compatible with the long run price setting.

<sup>33</sup> This follows from; response ( $y_{t,t}$ ) = 0, response ( $y_t$ ) =  $\theta_1$ , response ( $y_{t+1}$ ) =  $B \times$  response ( $y_t$ ) =  $B \times \theta_1$  and so on. The response to the depreciation in 1992 is determined by the same formula given that the exchange rate change is captured by  $\Delta D_{3,t}$ .

<sup>34</sup> One should though bear in mind that rejections of  $H_2$  can be due to composition effects or a too short sample of data.

For the *automobile export to the United Kingdom*, the markup is non-stationary ( $H_1$  is rejected) and the exporters are not price taking ( $H_2$  is rejected) which suggest long run market power. Destination specific variables do affect the price setting and the market share seems to matter for the pricing to market behaviour since neither  $H_3$  nor  $H_5$  can be rejected. However, if the exporters are partially price taking, a relation where the price of substitutes enters explicitly ( $H_3$ ) seems somewhat more plausible theoretically, than a relation with a concern merely for market shares ( $H_5$ ) disregarding the price of competing goods. Thus,  $H_3$  indicates that nominal neutrality seems to be at hand and that exchange rate changes and changes in the price of substitutes will be of equal importance for the price determination.

To *France, the automobile exporters* seem to agree on a common local currency price since the hypothesis of a stable relative price ( $H_2$ ) can not be rejected. The Swedish exporters do not seem to be able to alter the average relation between their price and that of their competitors. Hence, an exchange rate change will be completely absorbed by the profit margin and the local currency price will stay invariant. Likewise, foreign competitors will, through changes in  $p^{sub}$ , fully affect the price in the exporter's currency. Allowing a larger cointegration rank, which seems to be the case according to the trace test, strengthens this conclusion.

The *kraft paper exporters to the German* market seem to have some market power and ability to charge a non-zero markup ( $H_1$  is rejected). The producers do not have a long run stable relative price ( $H_2$  is rejected). Accordingly, the export price does not fully respond to changes in the exchange rate or the competitors' price. The market share can not be excluded from the price determination and hence, seems to matter for the pricing to market behaviour ( $H_3$  can not be rejected while  $H_4$  is rejected). Furthermore, the effects of exchange rate changes and changes in substitute prices appear to be equal and are thus affecting the export price to the same extent.

For the *United Kingdom, the kraft paper exporters* use non-stationary markups and do not seem to stabilize a common local currency price ( $H_2$  is rejected). There is no clearcut conclusion whether the market share matters for the price discrimination or not, since neither  $H_3$ ,  $H_4$  nor  $H_5$  can be rejected. However,  $H_4$  gives coefficients closer to the expected ones (see Table 9) suggesting that the market share should be excluded, in that case characterizing a pricing to market behaviour that is not directed by the concern for market shares. Foreign



conditions such as e.g. the degree of competition will thus primarily be reflected by the relative cost. The results do not change if one allows a larger cointegration rank.

The *kraft paper exporters' market power in the French market* is used for price discrimination ( $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are rejected). The source of markup variation and whether the pricing to market behaviour is characterized by the concern for maintaining market shares is however unclear given that all hypotheses where the price cointegrates with destination specific variables are rejected. However, when allowing for three cointegrating relations  $H_5$  can not be rejected why the market share seems to matter for the price determination in that case.

For a more tractable comparison and summary of which hypotheses are rejected across different destinations and goods, for the long run price setting, see Table 6.

#### 4.4.2 The market share and the short-run dynamics

Even though the results seem to indicate that the market share does not matter for the degree of long run price discrimination for some markets, its relevance can differ for the short-run dynamics of the price determination. If for example the relative price between the Swedish exports and the competing products is stable in the long run (as in the case of automobile exports to France) there might still be deviations from such a relation in the short-run, suggesting that the market share could matter for the short-run price setting. The coefficients on the lagged changes of the market share in the price equation ( $\Gamma_{j,13}$ ) are displayed in Table 7. For all destinations the size of these coefficients are rather small, indicating that changes in the market share do not influence the price setting to any greater extent. In order to test whether the market share affect the determination of export price changes or not, a likelihood ratio test is formulated on the hypothesis  $\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$ . This hypothesis can not be rejected for any of the destination markets (see Table 8) implying that the export price is not affected by market share changes in the short-run.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The likelihood ratio test is carried out with the cointegrating relations unrestricted.

#### 4.4.3 Exchange rate pass-through estimates

For the automobile exports to Germany neither  $H_3$  nor  $H_4$  can be rejected but the relation where the market share can be excluded,  $H_4$ , gives more plausible coefficients. The exchange rate elasticity of the export price is 0.257 implying an incomplete long run, partial, pass-through of +74 % (see Table 9). In comparison, the local currency price in the German kraft paper market is more invariant to a movement in the exchange rate with a pass-through of only +18 %. For the automobile exports to the United Kingdom the partial exchange rate elasticity of the export price is -0.836 (+184 % pass-through). A negative elasticity implies that for example an appreciation of the exporters' currency increases the export price and thus enlarges the effect on the foreign currency price (i.e. a pass-through to the import price greater than one), instead of stabilizing the foreign currency price (as one would expect). The exchange rate pass-through to the import price can also be negative (originating in an exchange rate elasticity of the export price greater than one), as seems to be the case for the British kraft paper market. Hence, if the exchange rate change has such a large effect on the export price, in contrast to the expected response, a depreciation of the exporters' currency could in fact increase the local currency price. For the automobile exports to France the local currency price seems to be completely stabilized (zero pass-through). The exporters follow some sort of price taking behaviour and the price in the exporter's currency is therefore fully affected by exchange rate changes.

In order to determine the effect of an exchange rate change more precisely (allowing for the cross-effects between the variables), the exogenous exchange rate movements, reflected by the devaluations in 1981 and 1982 and the depreciation in 1992, are more thoroughly examined.

The total short-run pass-through of the devaluations in 1981 and 1982 appears to be incomplete for the automobile exports to Germany. The immediate effect on the export price is less than 30 % for both devaluations (see Table 10). Although the response seems to be increasing over the quarters following the devaluations, which implies that the pass-through decreases over time, the export price to Germany does not appear to be fully adjusted after the exchange rate changes. For the automobile export to the United Kingdom the response in the export pricing, on average, is somewhat larger compared to Germany, and the British local currency price is thus more invariant to these exchange rate changes. However, the response

of the export price to the United Kingdom seems quite disparate comparing the devaluations in 1981 and 1982. For the devaluation in 1981 the export price in the British automobile market seems to be almost completely affected immediately (115 %) while the contemporaneous response to the 1982 devaluation is nearly zero (3 %) implying a full adjustment of the local currency price (i.e. a complete pass-through).

For the kraft paper markets there is a weaker indication of an incomplete pass-through to the local currency price. The contemporaneous pass-through is limited but the devaluations seem to be almost entirely incorporated into the export price within a quarter on average. The exchange rate effect, within a quarter, on the export price, for the German kraft paper market, is 108 % for the 1981 devaluation and 80 % for the 1982 devaluation (implying a pass-through of -8 % and +20 % respectively). For the British kraft paper market the effect on the export price is 109 % for both devaluations (-9 % pass-through). Hence, the results indicate that the pass-through in the kraft paper markets, on average, works slightly more stabilizing for the local currency price compared to the automobile markets. Furthermore, the local currency price adjustment, a year after the depreciation of the exchange rate, span between -85 % and +10 % for the 1981 devaluation and between -31 % and +61 % for the 1982 devaluation. However, on average the results indicate no greater distinction between the two devaluations (with the exception of the British automobile market). Contrary to the expected response of a stable or possibly decreased local currency price, a devaluation could hence also increase the import price, although on average the pass-through response seems to be positive.<sup>36</sup>

For the French automobile and kraft paper markets the local currency price seem to vary almost fully with the depreciation in 1992 (see Table 10). The pass-through, a year after the exchange rate change, is +110 %. For the other destination markets, the pass-through coefficients of the depreciation in 1992 seem to differ somewhat from the responses to the devaluations in the eighties. The largest disparities, compared to the devaluations in 1981 and 1982, occur in the German and British kraft paper markets. Furthermore, the responses, in all markets, seem to be more volatile after the regime shift in 1992 than after the devaluations in 1981 and 1982. However, given the costs of adjusting the supplied quantity the pass-through will be a result of exchange rate expectations, which probably varied more after the regime

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<sup>36</sup> The total short-run pass-through, based on the devaluations in 1981 and 1982, can not be estimated for the French data since the sample period starts in 1984.

shift in 1992 than after the exogenously specified devaluations in 1981 and 1982 under a fixed exchange rate regime. A greater uncertainty about the future development of the exchange rate can thus yield a different pricing response to an exchange rate change. On average the exchange rate change is passed through to the local currency price to a greater extent for the depreciation in 1992 compared to the devaluations in 1981 and 1982.

For a comparison, the partial short-run dynamics, i.e. the exchange rate coefficient of the pricing equation ( $\Gamma_{j,14}$ ), are displayed in Table 7. The partial pass-throughs differ across destinations as well as between products. As expected, the partial coefficients also differ from the total effect within a quarter, for all destination markets. These partial coefficients show that the producers only pass-through a fraction of the exchange rate change to the price in the buyer's currency. The partial pass-through to the local currency price is non-zero and less than complete, ranging between +36 % and +97 % except for the exporters of automobiles to the French market, who seem to completely absorb the exchange rate change (-14 % pass-through) and thus leave the local currency price almost constant. The partial pass-through effect, on average, seems to work less stabilizing, for the local currency price, in the kraft paper markets than in the automobile markets. However, the majority of the coefficients are insignificant.

To formally test whether the partial short-run exchange rate elasticity of the export price is complete,  $\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$ , (implying a partial short-run pass-through (within a quarter), to the import price, of zero) a likelihood ratio test is formulated (see Table 8). Even though the point estimates of the exchange rate elasticity are less than one for the British automobile market and the French kraft paper market, the hypothesis of a full adjustment of the export price can not be rejected. The exporters thus seem to keep the local currency price stable when the exchange rate changes. For these markets the short-run pass-through to the import price within one quarter is zero, in contrast to the long run price setting relation which seems to indicate a non-zero long run pass-through. The attempt to stabilize demand in the short-run while adjusting the local currency price, and thus also quantity, to an exchange rate change in the long run, could be interpreted as an effect of the quadratic costs of adjusting supply which imply a more costly adjustment the quicker it is undertaken. For the automobile exports to Germany, and the kraft paper exports to Germany and the United Kingdom, the export price does not fully adjust to the exchange rate change and the partial short-run pass-through is thus non-zero. For the French automobile market the exporters seem to completely absorb

exchange rate changes both in the short and long run (neither the short-run hypothesis,  $\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$ , nor the long run hypothesis of stable relative price can be rejected).

#### 4.5 Robustness of the results

The critical values of all likelihood ratio tests, of linear restrictions on the cointegration vectors, rely on asymptotic  $\chi^2$  distributions and given that simulated empirical critical values typically are substantially larger, there is a tendency to reject the null hypothesis too often. The asymptotic distribution is then a poor approximation of the small sample distribution and since the system consists of relatively many estimated parameters (resulting from many variables and several cointegration vectors) and rather few observations, the inference based on the asymptotic distribution could thus be weak. The results should therefore be interpreted with this in mind.

One way of correcting the critical values is to approximate the finite, small sample distribution with the use of response surface regressions (from a data generating process of another VEC model) adjusting for the number of dimensions (n), lags (k) and cointegration vectors (r) for a given sample size (see Gredenhoff and Jacobson, 1998 for a discussion of these matters and the response surface regressions)<sup>37</sup>. Using these response adjusted critical values does, however, not change the results to any greater extent.<sup>38</sup> For what it is worth, the use of the response adjusted  $\chi^2$  distribution, strengthens the conclusion that destination specific conditions like the market share and the exchange rate matter for the price determination at least in the kraft paper markets. Moreover, for all automobile markets it suggests that the exporters have less market power and agree on a common local currency price such that the relative price between the Swedish exports of automobiles and the competing products is stable.

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<sup>37</sup> Another and more adequate approach would be to approximate the distribution by a simulated bootstrap distribution from the data of the specific model used here. However, this lies beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>38</sup> These response adjusted critical values should however be interpreted with caution since they are produced by a data generating process of a different model.

The alternative specification with a unit labor cost index as proxying the marginal costs indicates similar results as when using the producer price indices as cost approximations. The results show that the producers have non-stationary markups, which suggests that they have some market power in every destination market. However, in this alternative system, it seems as if the Swedish exporters of automobiles to a somewhat greater extent are influenced by the price of substitutes. Apart from the seeming price taking behaviour in the French automobile market, the local currency prices are also invariant to exchange rate changes in the German automobile market. The conclusion that the market share matters for the price relation in the kraft paper markets is robust to the specification change. Moreover, measuring the market share based on values, of  $X_i$  and  $M_i$ , instead of volumes does not alter the original results.

When interpreting all results from the likelihood ratio tests, one should bear in mind that the two cointegration vectors are unidentified from a strict economic perspective. Ideally one would like to distinguish the two vectors to be sure that the restrictions really are imposed on the specific price setting relation (instead of an arbitrary vector). One could argue that the tested hypotheses are designated for a price setting vector and should not satisfy for example a demand vector. Nevertheless, the imposed restrictions might apply to some other long run relation among the variables. When trying to identify the demand vector by excluding the marginal costs (i.e. by imposing  $[\beta_{21}, 0, 1, \beta_{24}, \beta_{25}]'$  on this vector), the coefficients of this presumed demand vector turn out very large and with the wrong sign, why the problems of economic identification appear to prevail. These difficulties are though not specific to the multivariate approach or framework used here but can be found in any study of demand and supply relations. However, in many studies the identification problems are overlooked and not dealt with explicitly.

## 5 Conclusions

The theoretical presumption that a small open economy's price taking behaviour differs from a large country's price determination is somewhat contrasted by the results, which appear to be consistent with price discrimination in Swedish exports of automobiles and kraft paper. The Swedish exporters seem to price to market and take foreign conditions into consideration, such as destination specific substitute prices and exchange rates. In the French automobile market, however, the exporters seem to agree with other exporters on a common local

currency price. The average relation between the price of Swedish exporters and that of their competitors is stable. The price in the exporter's currency will therefore be fully adjusted to an exchange rate change. On the British and German automobile and kraft paper markets Swedish exporters seem to have some market power and ability to affect their price. The pricing behaviour appears to be determined by market structure characteristics, which differ between goods and destinations. The effect on the export price of changes in exchange rates and prices of foreign substitutes is incomplete. The determination of the export price in these markets is characterized by some concern for maintaining market shares. However, for the German automobile market and the British kraft paper market the point estimates of the coefficients are more reasonable when the market share is excluded from the price setting relation. Although the market share seems less important for the long run pricing to market behaviour in these markets, one interpretation of this is that a less restrictive relation between the exported quantity and total imports of the good to the destination market may be relevant for the price setting. For the French kraft paper market the source of markup variation is unclear, given that the hypothesized long run price relations where the export price cointegrates with destination specific variables are rejected. In addition, the short-run influence of the market share on the price setting seems to be very limited for all markets and the results suggest that market share changes have no effect for price changes in the short-run.

The results indicate no distinct disparity, between the two commodities, when it comes to the presence of a pricing to market behaviour. Automobiles are supposed to be less homogenous than kraft paper. Nevertheless, the only evidence of price taking behaviour and lack of market power, or possibly of intentional price collaboration, occurs in the French automobile market. Furthermore, for both automobiles and kraft paper there is an indication of market segmentation and the presumed difference due to product differentiation does not seem to occur. Hence, this could be interpreted as other market structure characteristics than product substitutability being important for the Swedish export price determination.

The conclusion that the market share matters for the long run price determination seems to be quite robust also when using small sample adjusted critical values and another specification with a different marginal cost approximation. This is true at least for the kraft paper markets where the market share can not be rejected. However, for the automobile markets there is an indication of a price taking behaviour to a somewhat greater extent.

Previous studies have mainly used a single equation framework, abstracting from the problems arising when finding several long run relations. The cointegration analysis in this paper indicates two cointegrating relations, for most destination markets, implying problems of identification and interpretation. Ideally one would like to interpret the two cointegration vectors as reflecting e.g. price setting (supply) and demand. However, given the number of variables there could be several potential relations affecting the system why the cointegration vectors and results have to be interpreted with caution. A finding of several long run relations also introduces questions of how to define the pass-through effect. The partial coefficient only measures the effect an exchange rate change has on the price setting relation, excluding the effects going through other variables and other interactions of the price determination system. The total exchange rate pass-through coefficients measure the effect working through all variables and through both the short-run dynamics and the long run relations.

The estimates of the total short-run effect within a quarter, of the two devaluations of the krona in the eighties, on the export price span between 62 % and 148 % (implying a pass-through of +38 % and -48 % respectively). A year after the devaluations of the exchange rate, the total pass-through span between -85 % and +61 %. The total pass-through response a year after the depreciation in 1992, in contrast, is somewhat greater and span between +22 % and +111 %. On average, there seems to be an indication of a positive, less than full, pass-through to the local currency price for both automobiles and kraft paper. The producers will thus absorb a fraction of the exchange rate change and the local currency price will be partly, but not completely, stabilized.



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## Appendix

### A.1 Data definitions

$P$  - export unit value index (export value in kronor divided by pieces (cars) or ton (kraft paper), quarterly averages from monthly data, 1980:1=1). Source: Statistics Sweden.

$E$  - exchange rate index (market spot averages, quarterly data, 1980:1=1). Source: Bank of International Settlements, Basel.

$PPI^r$  - producer price index (Swedish transport equipment, quarterly averages from monthly data, 1980:1=1). Source: Statistics Sweden.

$PPF^{pulp}$  - producer price index (Swedish pulp, quarterly averages from monthly data, 1980:1=1). Source: Statistics Sweden.

$P^{sub}$  - import unit value index (total imports for each destination country in local currency divided by pieces (cars) or ton (kraft paper), quarterly averages from monthly data, 1980:1=1<sup>39</sup>). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Germany), EUROSTAT (France and United Kingdom), Department of Commerce (US) and Central Statistical Office (United Kingdom).

$SH$  - market share index,  $X / M$ , (Swedish export volume of a good divided by the total volume of imports of the good to one destination, 1980:1=1<sup>40</sup>), where

$X$  - exported quantity (pieces (cars) or ton (kraft paper), quarterly from aggregating monthly data). Source: Statistics Sweden.

$M$  - total imported quantity to each destination (pieces (cars) or ton (kraft paper), (quarterly from aggregating monthly data). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Germany), EUROSTAT (France and United Kingdom), Department of Commerce (US) and Central Statistical Office (United Kingdom).

Included products:

Kraft paper, board, uncoated; SITC 6414

Passenger transport vehicles; SITC 7812

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<sup>39</sup> France; 1984:1=1.

<sup>40</sup> France; 1984:1=1.

## A.2 Tables and Figures

Table 1: Correlation between the relative price,  $\ln (P_i / P_j)$ , and the relative market share,  $\ln (SH_i / SH_j)$

	GE-UK	GE-FR	UK-FR
Automobiles	0.004	<b>0.376</b>	<b>-0.267</b>
Kraft paper	<b>-0.408</b>	0.236	-0.066

Note: Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level. For Germany - the United Kingdom the correlation is calculated over the period 1980:1-1994:4. For Germany - France and for the United Kingdom - France it is calculated over 1984:1-1994:4 (for data definitions see Appendix A.1).

Table 2a: Model specification tests (multivariate) VAR (r = 5)

Destination Number of lags	Schwarz information criterion	Hannan- Quinn info. criterion	LM(1) <sup>41</sup> p-value	LM(4) p-value	Normality p-value
Automobiles:					
Germany					
k=1	-31.422	-33.032	0.02	0.19	0.00
k=2	-31.379	-33.548	0.90	0.07	0.02
<b>k=3</b>	-30.965	-33.704	0.14	0.21	0.07
k=4	-30.027	-33.348	0.19	0.15	0.33
United Kingdom					
k=1	-29.144	-30.647	0.00	0.86	0.11
<b>k=2</b>	-28.787	-30.847	0.52	0.99	0.14
k=3	-27.737	-30.367	0.65	0.93	0.04
k=4	-26.62	-29.832	0.05	0.53	0.22
France					
k=1	-28.155	-29.577	0.00	0.08	0.04
<b>k=2</b>	-28.062	-30.159	0.01	0.50	0.24
k=3	-28.226	-31.017	0.18	0.48	0.28
k=4	-28.282	-31.786	0.25	0.42	0.97
Kraft paper:					
Germany					
k=1	-29.093	-30.489	0.37	0.02	0.27
<b>k=2</b>	-28.33	-30.282	0.26	0.08	0.37
k=3	-27.405	-29.925	0.17	0.22	0.24
k=4	-26.957	-30.058	0.30	0.12	0.16
United Kingdom					
k=1	-28.57	-29.97	0.00	0.41	0.96
<b>k=2</b>	-27.941	-29.893	0.35	0.71	0.79
k=3	-26.9	-29.42	0.03	0.45	0.64
k=4	-26.503	-29.603	0.27	0.13	0.23
France					
k=1	-28.298	-29.72	0.01	0.32	0.07
<b>k=2</b>	-27.868	-29.965	0.56	0.00	0.01
k=3	-27.315	-30.105	0.02	0.12	0.06
k=4	-27.661	-31.164	0.31	0.49	0.17

Note: The chosen lag specification is indicated in bold numbers.

<sup>41</sup> LM(q) is a Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation of order q.

Table 2b: Model specification tests (multivariate) VEC

Destination Number of lags	Rank							
	r=1		r=2		r=3		r=4	
	LM(1) p-value	Norm. p-value	LM(1) p-value	Norm. p-value	LM(1) p-value	Norm. p-value	LM(1) p-value	Norm. p-value
<b>Automobiles:</b>								
<b>Germany</b>								
k=1	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00
k=2	0.45	0.00	0.88	0.02	0.84	0.06	0.89	0.02
k=3	0.63	0.03	0.13	0.07	0.15	0.09	0.15	0.06
k=4	0.44	0.05	0.34	0.62	0.28	0.58	0.19	0.30
<b>United Kingdom</b>								
k=1	0.00	0.01	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.02</b>	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.11
k=2	<b>0.46</b>	<b>0.00</b>	0.35	0.00	0.37	0.07	0.44	0.12
k=3	<b>0.46</b>	<b>0.00</b>	0.56	0.01	0.52	0.01	0.54	0.04
k=4	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0.05</b>	0.15	0.11	0.08	0.07
<b>France</b>								
k=1	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02
k=2	0.01	0.64	0.01	0.42	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.10</b>	0.01	0.19
k=3	0.49	0.68	0.55	0.90	0.45	0.38	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.21</b>
k=4	0.18	0.82	0.50	0.85	0.33	0.94	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.97</b>
<b>Kraft paper:</b>								
<b>Germany</b>								
k=1	0.05	0.19	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.23</b>	0.29	0.15	0.36	0.36
k=2	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.18</b>	0.28	0.13	0.24	0.28	0.26	0.32
k=3	<b>0.32</b>	<b>0.06</b>	0.37	0.11	0.54	0.14	0.34	0.21
k=4	0.17	0.73	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.76</b>	0.26	0.23	0.30	0.12
<b>United Kingdom</b>								
k=1	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.30	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.61</b>	0.00	0.96
k=2	0.04	0.52	0.07	0.76	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.92</b>	0.34	0.86
k=3	0.11	0.95	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.93</b>	0.03	0.77	0.02	0.65
k=4	0.11	0.74	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.78</b>	0.65	0.68	0.27	0.30
<b>France</b>								
k=1	0.02	0.01	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.02</b>	0.01	0.02	0.1	0.07
k=2	0.35	0.02	0.36	0.00	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.00</b>	0.39	0.01
k=3	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.03	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.02</b>	0.02	0.04
k=4	0.46	0.04	0.84	0.06	0.54	0.11	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.42</b>

Note: Bold numbers indicate suggested rank at the specific lag length (according to the Trace test with 5 % significance).

Table 2c: Model specification tests VEC (two cointegration vectors,  $r = 2$ )

Destination, lags Equation	Multivariate tests			Univariate tests		
	LM(1) p-value	LM(4) p-value	Normality p-value	ARCH(k) statistic <sup>42</sup>	Normality statistic <sup>43</sup>	R <sup>2</sup>
Automobiles: Germany, k=3	0.13	0.26	0.07			
$\Delta p_t$				3.773	0.711	0.730
$\Delta ppi_t^{tr}$				<b>14.901</b>	1.007	0.836
$\Delta sh_t$				0.574	<b>7.634</b>	0.762
$\Delta e_t$				3.966	5.312	0.725
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				2.062	1.44	0.700
United Kingdom, k=2	0.35	0.95	<b>0.00</b>			
$\Delta p_t$				0.752	1.52	0.255
$\Delta ppi_t^{tr}$				1.75	3.622	0.797
$\Delta sh_t$				2.164	3.311	0.764
$\Delta e_t$				3.953	1.675	0.498
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				5.126	<b>13.372</b>	0.738
France, k=2	<b>0.01</b>	0.31	0.42			
$\Delta p_t$				1.873	3.126	0.382
$\Delta ppi_t^{tr}$				3.014	2.88	0.863
$\Delta sh_t$				1.923	2.801	0.358
$\Delta e_t$				0.957	1.0	0.739
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				0.303	5.185	0.505
Kraft paper: Germany, k=2	0.28	0.13	0.13			
$\Delta p_t$				3.712	3.462	0.470
$\Delta ppi_t^{pulp}$				0.179	0.967	0.663
$\Delta sh_t$				0.102	2.345	0.637
$\Delta e_t$				2.933	4.544	0.685
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				2.236	1.704	0.330
United Kingdom, k=2	0.07	0.66	0.76			
$\Delta p_t$				0.102	1.314	0.550
$\Delta ppi_t^{pulp}$				0.754	0.295	0.601
$\Delta sh_t$				0.645	2.326	0.628
$\Delta e_t$				1.682	1.88	0.502
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				1.521	0.174	0.290
France, k=2	0.36	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>			
$\Delta p_t$				0.946	5.886	0.494
$\Delta ppi_t^{pulp}$				2.375	2.871	0.577
$\Delta sh_t$				1.562	0.545	0.490
$\Delta e_t$				0.089	<b>8.170</b>	0.640
$\Delta p_t^{sub}$				0.898	<b>6.732</b>	0.771

Note: Bold numbers indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected with 5 % significance (asymptotic distribution).

<sup>42</sup> Test statistic from a univariate Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH of order k. It is asymptotically  $\chi^2(k)$ .

<sup>43</sup> Asymptotically distributed  $\chi^2(2)$ .



Table 3: Cointegration rank

Country	Null hypothesis	Eigenvalue	Trace
<b>Automobiles:</b>			
Germany 3 lags	$r = 0$	0.4972	85.59
	$r \leq 1$	0.2895	46.40
	$r \leq 2$	0.2479	26.92
	$r \leq 3$	0.1650	10.68
	$r \leq 4$	0.0070	0.40
United Kingdom 2 lags	$r = 0$	0.4588	96.01
	$r \leq 1$	0.3474	60.41
	$r \leq 2$	0.3097	35.65
	$r \leq 3$	0.1349	14.15
	$r \leq 4$	0.0944	5.75
France 2 lags	$r = 0$	0.7365	135.64
	$r \leq 1$	0.5598	79.62
	$r \leq 2$	0.4650	45.16
	$r \leq 3$	0.2615	18.89
	$r \leq 4$	0.1363	6.15
<b>Kraft Paper:</b>			
Germany 2 lags	$r = 0$	0.5264	103.04
	$r \leq 1$	0.4705	59.70
	$r \leq 2$	0.1982	22.82
	$r \leq 3$	0.1475	10.01
	$r \leq 4$	0.0129	0.75
United Kingdom 2 lags	$r = 0$	0.5332	121.78
	$r \leq 1$	0.4360	77.60
	$r \leq 2$	0.3475	44.38
	$r \leq 3$	0.2349	19.62
	$r \leq 4$	0.0680	4.08
France 2 lags	$r = 0$	0.7108	143.28
	$r \leq 1$	0.5830	91.18
	$r \leq 2$	0.5021	54.44
	$r \leq 3$	0.4212	25.15
	$r \leq 4$	0.0507	2.18

Critical value 95% quantile by Osterwald-Lenum (1992) Table2\* (unrestricted constant and trend in  $\beta$ -space):

No. of cointegration vectors	Trace
$r = 0$	87.31
$r \leq 1$	62.99
$r \leq 2$	42.44
$r \leq 3$	25.32
$r \leq 4$	12.25

Table 4: Relevant hypotheses to test

Hypothesis	
$H_1: p_i - ppi^l - \beta_{6t} \sim I(0)$	If non-stationary markup – monopoly power
$H_2: p_i - e_i - p_i^{sub} \sim I(0)$	Stationary relative price
$H_3: (p_i - e_i - p_i^{sub}) - \beta_{12}(ppi^l - e_i - p_i^{sub}) - \beta_{13}sh_i - \beta_{6t} \sim I(0)$	Symmetry on $e_i$ and $p_i^{sub}$ and nominal neutrality
$H_4: (p_i - e_i - p_i^{sub}) - \beta_{12}(ppi^l - e_i - p_i^{sub}) - \beta_{6t} \sim I(0)$	The market share does not matter
$H_5: p_i - ppi^l - \beta_{13}sh_i - \beta_{6t} \sim I(0)$	Covariation between the markup and the market share

Hypothesis testing (variable vector:  $[p, ppi^l, sh, e, p^{sub}, t]'$ )

Table 5a: Automobile exports to Germany

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
3 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=2.31$	0.51	unrestr. <sup>44</sup>
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]$	$\chi^2(4)=13.11$	0.01	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=0.01$	0.92	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=2.12$	0.35	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=1.05$	0.59	unrestr.

Table 5b: Automobile exports to the United Kingdom

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
2 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=11.95$	0.01	unrestr.
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]$	$\chi^2(4)=17.56$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=2.36$	0.12	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=10.80$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=5.70$	0.06	unrestr.

Table 5c: Automobile exports to France

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
2 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=12.28$	0.01	unrestr.
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]$	$\chi^2(4)=9.25$	0.06	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=4.30$	0.04	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=4.58$	0.10	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=9.62$	0.01	unrestr.
3 vectors	$H_1$	$\chi^2(2)=4.82$	0.09	unrestr.
	$H_2$	$\chi^2(3)=4.28$	0.23	unrestr.
	$H_4$	$\chi^2(1)=0.16$	0.69	unrestr.
	$H_5$	$\chi^2(1)=3.73$	0.05	unrestr.

<sup>44</sup> The other vector is unrestricted.

Table 5d: Kraft paper exports to Germany

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
2 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=26.84$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]$	$\chi^2(4)=34.51$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=3.05$	0.08	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=21.23$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=6.82$	0.03	unrestr.

Table 5e: Kraft paper exports to the United Kingdom

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
2 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=14.56$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]$	$\chi^2(4)=23.17$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=1.24$	0.26	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=3.59$	0.17	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=2.28$	0.32	unrestr.
3 vectors	$H_1$	$\chi^2(2)=10.08$	0.01	unrestr.
	$H_2$	$\chi^2(3)=20.48$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_4$	$\chi^2(1)=3.59$	0.06	unrestr.
	$H_5$	$\chi^2(1)=0.29$	0.59	unrestr.

Table 5f: Kraft paper exports to France

Specification	Hypothesis	Likelihood ratio statistic	p-value	
2 lags, constant dummies, trend 2 vectors	$H_1=[1,-1,0,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(3)=25.01$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_2=[1,0,0,-1,-1,0]'$	$\chi^2(4)=19.93$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_3=[1,-\beta_2,-\beta_3,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(1)=5.93$	0.01	unrestr.
	$H_4=[1,-\beta_2,0,\beta_2-1,\beta_2-1,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=12.37$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_5=[1,-1,-\beta_3,0,0,\beta_6]'$	$\chi^2(2)=6.32$	0.04	unrestr.
3 vectors	$H_1$	$\chi^2(2)=19.63$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_2$	$\chi^2(3)=12.88$	0.00	unrestr.
	$H_4$	$\chi^2(1)=5.45$	0.02	unrestr.
	$H_5$	$\chi^2(1)=0.28$	0.59	unrestr.

Table 6: Summary of the long run hypothesis testing

Hypothesis	Automobiles			Kraft paper		
	GE	UK	FR	GE	UK	FR
$H_1$ : Trend stationary markup		*	*	**	**	**
$H_2$ : Stationary relative price	*	**		**	**	**
$H_3$ : Symmetry and nominal neutrality			*			*
$H_4$ : Market share does not matter		**		**		**
$H_5$ : Market share matters exclusively			*	*		*

Note: \* denotes rejection at 5 % significance (asymptotic distribution). \*\* denotes rejection at 1 % significance (asymptotic distribution). Two cointegrating relations, the second vector is unrestricted.

Table 7: Partial short-run dynamics of the market share and the exchange rate (coefficients in the pricing equation)

Destination, lags	$\Delta sh_{t-1} (\Gamma_{1,13})$	$\Delta sh_{t-2} (\Gamma_{2,13})$	$\Delta e_{t-1} (\Gamma_{1,14})$	$\Delta e_{t-2} (\Gamma_{2,14})$
<b>Automobiles:</b>				
Germany, k=3	0.04	0.053*	0.032	-0.147
United Kingdom, k=2	0.017		0.466	
France, k=2	-0.011		1.135*	
<b>Kraft paper:</b>				
Germany, k=2	-0.063		0.492*	
United Kingdom, k=2	-0.07		0.174	
France, k=2	0.048		0.639*	

Note: \* denotes significance at the 5 % level.

Table 8: Short-run dynamics (hypothesis testing on the pricing equation)

Destination, lags	Hypothesis	Test statistic	p-value
<b>Automobiles:</b>			
Germany, k=3	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=2.61$	0.11
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=30.48$	0.00
	$\Gamma_{1,13} = \Gamma_{2,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(2)=6.13$	0.05
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = \Gamma_{2,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(2)=63.22$	0.00
United Kingdom, k=2	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=0.44$	0.51
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=3.95$	0.05
France, k=2	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=0.07$	0.78
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=0.04$	0.83
<b>Kraft paper:</b>			
Germany, k=2	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=2.10$	0.15
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=9.66$	0.00
United Kingdom, k=2	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=3.00$	0.08
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=27.56$	0.00
France, k=2	$\Gamma_{1,13} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=1.85$	0.17
	$\Gamma_{1,14} = 1$	$\chi^2(1)=2.12$	0.15

Table 9: Point estimates in the two cointegrating relations<sup>45</sup>

Destination	Point estimates
Automobiles: Germany	$H_3: p - e - p^{sub} = -2.727 (ppi^{tr} - e - p^{sub}) - 1.529 sh - 0.062 t$ $H_4: p - e - p^{sub} = 0.743 (ppi^{tr} - e - p^{sub}) + 0.008 t$  $sh = - 1.535 p + 3.514 e + 1.362 p^{sub} - 0.033 t$
United Kingdom	$H_3: p - e - p^{sub} = 1.836 (ppi^{tr} - e - p^{sub}) - 0.426 sh + 0.023 t$  $sh = 6.129 p - 22.261 e + 8.987 p^{sub} - 0.364 t$
France	$H_2: p = e + p^{sub}$ $H_4: p - e - p^{sub} = - 0.354 (ppi^{tr} - e - p^{sub}) - 0.001 t$  $sh = - 2.633 p - 31.399 e - 10.019 p^{sub} + 0.324 t$
Kraft paper: Germany	$H_3: p - e - p^{sub} = 0.179 (ppi^{pulp} - e - p^{sub}) - 0.920 sh + 0.005 t$  $sh = - 4.498 p + 5.663 e + 2.889 p^{sub} + 0.009 t$
United Kingdom	$H_3: p - e - p^{sub} = - 0.973 (ppi^{pulp} - e - p^{sub}) - 1.681 sh + 0.026 t$ $H_4: p - e - p^{sub} = - 0.288 (ppi^{pulp} - e - p^{sub}) + 0.004 t$  $sh = 32.742 p - 34.906 e - 23.292 p^{sub} + 0.162 t$
France	$H_3: p - e - p^{sub} = - 0.553 (ppi^{pulp} - e - p^{sub}) + 1.411 sh - 0.015 t$ $H_4: p - e - p^{sub} = - 0.229 (ppi^{pulp} - e - p^{sub}) - 0.001 t$ (Note that both H <sub>3</sub> and H <sub>4</sub> are rejected.)  $sh = - 0.012 p - 1.042 e + 1.953 p^{sub} + 0.001 t$

<sup>45</sup> The identifying restrictions on the demand vector are;  $[\beta_{21}, 0, 1, \beta_{24}, \beta_{25}, \beta_{26}]'$ . Since focus lies on the exchange rate elasticity, only the non-rejected hypotheses of H<sub>2</sub>, H<sub>3</sub> or H<sub>4</sub> are reported (except for the French kraft paper market).

Table 10: Total short-run exchange rate effect (response  $(\Delta p_{t+s})$  / response  $(\Delta e_t)$ )

Destination, lags	s=0	s=1	s=2	s=3	s=4
<b>Automobiles:</b>					
<b>Germany, k=3</b>					
81:4	0.2913	0.6232	0.7330	0.6024	0.9021
82:4	0.1526	0.6282	0.7297	0.6472	0.8944
92:4	-0.0952	0.5074	0.4912	0.5513	0.7817
<b>United Kingdom, k=2</b>					
81:4	1.1528	1.4792	1.7741	1.7653	1.8479
82:4	0.0308	0.7631	0.5735	0.4230	0.3851
92:4	0.2113	0.8656	0.5470	0.2845	0.1664
<b>France, k=3</b>					
92:4	-0.1848	1.1552	0.2762	0.1161	-0.0955
<b>Kraft paper:</b>					
<b>Germany, k=2</b>					
81:4	0.7978	1.0750	1.3145	1.3626	1.4591
82:4	0.5000	0.7920	0.7867	0.8523	0.9268
92:4	-0.2714	0.1356	-0.2233	-0.1574	-0.1139
<b>United Kingdom, k=2</b>					
81:4	0.4776	1.0886	1.1644	1.2754	1.3458
82:4	0.8031	1.0909	1.1833	1.2742	1.3192
92:4	-0.8182	0.5863	0.0574	-0.0079	0.0956
<b>France, k=3</b>					
92:4	-0.4896	0.3005	-0.0029	-0.1694	-0.1009

Note: The sample period for France is 1984:1-1994:4.



Markups ( $mup_i = \ln(\text{export price to market } i / \text{domestic producer price index})$ )<sup>46</sup>




Figure 1: Automobile exports to Germany




Figure 2: Kraft paper exports to Germany




Figure 3: Automobile exports to the United Kingdom




Figure 4: Kraft paper exports to the United Kingdom




Figure 5: Automobile exports to France




Figure 6: Kraft paper exports to France

<sup>46</sup> Given that the series are indices, a negative markup just indicates a quicker percentage movement in the producer price series.

Relative price  $(p_i - p_i^{sub} - e_i)$  and relative cost  $(ppi^l - p_i^{sub} - e_i)$ <sup>47</sup>




Figure 7: Automobile exports to Germany




Figure 8: Kraft paper exports to Germany




Figure 9: Automobile exports to the United Kingdom




Figure 10: Kraft paper exports to the United Kingdom




Figure 11: Automobile exports to France




Figure 12: Kraft paper exports to France

<sup>47</sup> A decreasing relative cost could be explained by the productivity growth not captured by the producer price index.

Relative price,  $(p_i - p_j)$ , (solid, left scale) and market share,  $(sh_i - sh_j)$ , (dashed, right scale)




Figure 13: Automobile exports  
Germany-United Kingdom




Figure 14: Kraft paper exports  
Germany-United Kingdom




Figure 15: Automobile exports  
Germany-France




Figure 16: Kraft paper exports  
Germany-France




Figure 17: Automobile exports  
United Kingdom-France




Figure 18: Kraft paper exports  
United Kingdom-France

Average relative prices  $(\overline{p_i - p_j})$  and average market shares  $(\overline{sh_i - sh_j})$




Figure 19: Automobile exports




Figure 20: Kraft paper exports

Outliers in the export price series ( $p_i$ ) and the series for the price of substitutes ( $p_i^{sub}$ )




Figure 21: First difference of the export price to the German automobile market ( $\Delta p_{GE}$ )




Figure 22: First difference of the price of substitutes on the German automobile market ( $\Delta p_{GE}^{sub}$ )




Figure 23: First difference of the price of substitutes on the British automobile market ( $\Delta p_{UK}^{sub}$ )